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ACCOUNTABILITY AND SERVICE DELIVERY IN UGANDA'S LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

A Report on the District Peer Review Mechanism Exercise Conducted in the Districts of Napak, Amuria and Katakwi

Cover Photo: Children fetching water from one of the rare boreholes in Amuria District.

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect those of the Democratic Governance Facility or its employees.

Foreword

Uganda Debt Network (UDN) believes in exploring new approaches in an ever-continuous quest for uncharted territories. This principle has enabled us to register an impact in terms of pursuing our mission: 'To generate advocacy expertise that influences people-based and accountable public resource management in Uganda.'

While we have scored successes in areas where we used UDN's Community Based Monitoring and Evaluation System (CBMES) model, we admit that our partners, especially the government which we complement, have sometimes come in at the later stages of the interventions we engage in rather than being directly involved in the entire process of generating the information we produce and report about.

This report represents a paradigm shift in the sense that, unlike other approaches, DPRM was a watershed for moving with stakeholders all the way; most importantly including local government officials, private sector, civil society and religious leaders in the formulation of governance tools, training, data collection, analysis, report production and dissemination.

What is immediately most impressive is that the selected districts were highly receptive to the approach and gave it their all; and whatever the outcome, it is thus shared by us all.

This report shows both the good and the gaps in local governments. However, far from being judgemental, it applauds the efforts of officials despite the challenging environments in which they operate; seeks alternatives and proposes options that could make service delivery and accountability better in the respective contexts. It also affords each participating district the possibilities of borrowing a leaf from its peers in dealing with similar circumstances.

Notwithstanding the limitations that are especially attributable to the fact that the DPRM model was being pioneered in the area, the positive outcomes of the report provide a platform for acknowledging and congratulating the participating districts, officials / respondents and assessors for the resolve to deliver on this novel product. Without your participation, this report would not have seen the light of day.

Finally, I thank the technical team for making it happen; they included Yusuf Kiranda (Consultant), Gilbert Musinguzi (Quality Assurance Manager and overall Coordinator), Jude Odaro (Programme Manager - Community Empowerment and Engagement), Richard Ssempala (Research Associate) Moses Okoed (Research Associate) and 18 assessors.

UDN will work with stakeholders in following up on the recommendations of the report, and at the same time remain open to the application of any other upcoming innovations that are contributory to our vision – A Uganda where public resources are prudently, sustainably and equitably managed.

Patrick Tumwebaze

Executive Director UDN

Acronyms

CAO - Chief Administrative Officer
CBMES - Community Based Monitoring and Evaluation Systems
CBO - Community-Based Organisation
CDO - Community Development Office
CFO - Chief Finance Officer
CSO - Civil Society Organisation
DDC - District Contracts Committee
DDP - District Development Plan
DIPFs - District Integrity Promotion Forums
DPAC - District Public Accounts Committee
DPRM - District Peer Review Mechanism
DSC - District Service Commission
FMIS - Financial Information Management System
HDI - Human Development Index
IPF - Indicative Planning Figures
LGFC - Local Government Finance Commission
M&E - Monitoring and Evaluation
MDA - Ministries, Departments and Agencies
MoFPED - Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development
MoLG - Ministry of Local Government
MoPS - Ministry of Public Service
NGO - Non-governmental Organisation
PRDP - Peace, Recovery and Development Programme
UDN - Uganda Debt Network
ULGA - Uganda Local Governments Association
UNBS - Uganda National Bureau of Standards
UNDP - United Nations Development Programme
UNHS - Uganda National Household Survey
WDR - World Development Report

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Executive Summary

This report presents findings from a District Peer Review Mechanism (DPRM) conducted by UDN in co-operation with local government stakeholders in Amuria, Katakwi and Napak districts. The DPRM assesses specific aspects of governance at the district level. It is a participative process which blends self-assessment by leaders in a given district with a peer review by contemporaries from other districts, upon which basis a score is awarded. Scores from DPRM must be construed not necessarily as scientific findings but rather as perspectives (opinions) of local government stakeholders on the functioning of their district.

Findings from this study reveal a stark contradiction between the perspectives of duty bearers who have a highly positive ranking of the state of accountability and service delivery in their districts, on one side, and the evidence in terms of weak service delivery outcomes, on the other. According to the scores, district-level stakeholders have a positive perception of the state of accountability and service delivery in their districts. The overall scores for both accountability and service delivery is 8.2 out of the maximum possible score of 10. Tables 1 and 2 summarise the scores obtained by each district in the six assessment areas for accountability and the five assessment areas for service delivery.

Table 1: Average Assessment on Accountability across Target Districts

Ind.	Assessment areas	Amuria	Katakwi	Napak	District averages
	Sound budget process	9.2	9.2	9.1	9.2
	Comprehensive accountability system	9.0	8.2	8.4	8.5
	Management capability	8.3	9.2	8.0	8.5
	Citizen participation	8.7	8.6	8.1	8.5
	Separation of powers	8.4	7.1	7.6	7.7
	Anti-corruption	7.4	6.5	6.9	6.9
	Average scores under accountability	8.5	8.1	8.0	8.2

Table 2: Average Assessment on Service Delivery Across Target Districts

Ind.	Assessment areas	Amuria	Katakwi	Napak	District averages
	Resource capacity	8.7	8.4	8.2	8.4
	Management capability	8.3	7.7	8.3	8.1
	Service orientation	8.3	8.0	8.5	8.3
	Quantity & quality increase	8.5	7.5	8.3	8.1
	Citizen participation	7.6	8.0	8.5	8.0
	Average scores for service delivery	8.3	7.9	8.4	8.2

Though useful especially in depicting some levels of compliance (at least formally), the high scores presented above, do not necessarily confirm that the status of accountability and service delivery in the districts is entirely a healthy one. Triangulation with physical evidence, and with literature from independent surveys reveals that major gaps exist regarding accountability and service delivery.

It is therefore important to point out that the positive perception of district stakeholders is based on the existence of a well-built bureaucratic apparatus at district level. Uganda has an elaborate institutional framework to guide the management of public affairs. This framework is underlined by several legal instruments, such as the Public Finance and Management Act, the Local Government Act, and the Anti-Corruption Act, to mention a few. The districts assessed under this DPRM framework – Amuria, Katakwi and Napak – demonstrated implementation of the legal requirements for accountability and service delivery. However, the outcomes regarding service delivery and accountability remain weak. A deeper investigation of why observance of legal provisions does not yield desired accountability and service delivery outcomes remains necessary.

The DPRM exercise further established that the existing legal framework also imposes certain restrictions that make it difficult for the districts to function. Chief among the restrictions is the requirement that all costs of the district councils and their committees can only be covered under locally generated revenue and may not exceed 20 per cent of that revenue. Rural districts have weak local economies that are dependent on subsistence rain-fed agriculture. Subsistence farmers do not substantially participate in the money economy and therefore should not be expected to significantly contribute to district revenues through taxes. The districts generate revenue from secondary economic activities such as local markets. Market revenues are, however, precarious and keep fluctuating whenever agricultural activity is affected, mostly by climatic changes.

On the whole, therefore, rural districts such as the ones assessed have dismal local revenue collection levels of which 20 per cent can hardly finance the core activities of the district council. The table below shows the local revenues raised by the three assessed districts in the 2015/2016 financial year.

Table 3: Local Revenues Composition of Assessed Districts In FY 2015/2016

Budget / Revenue	Amuria	Katakwi	Napak	District Averages
Total budget estimates for district budget 2015/16	21,209,228,000	20,030,011,000	11,343,663,000	17,527,634,000
Local revenue for the year (actual)	383,566,000	453,627,000	189,000,000	342,064,333
Local revenue as percentage of total district budget	1.8 %	2.3 %	1.7 %	1.2 %

Source: Author's Analysis of Respective District Budgets

The limited budget available for the district councils present major challenges to the ability of elected leaders to fulfil their mandates. District councils and committees find it difficult to meet regularly as required; District find it difficult to facilitate councillors in performance of such duties as consulting their constituents or monitoring service delivery programmes in their areas; the training/orientation of elected councillors relies on sporadic interventions by NGOs; council facilities such as the meeting halls cannot be constructed or improved, to mention but a few. It is necessary that the operational capacity of elected officials, the people's representatives, is taken to be a critical part of the service delivery and accountability chain of local governments. For this functionality to happen, funding for the district councils is key.

Overall, limited financing is the main service delivery challenge to local governments. Central government allocations and transfers to local government remains relatively low in comparison to growth in the national budget. The chart below shows that local government transfers have remained almost constant despite exponential increases in the national budget. Interpreted differently, the share of local government transfers as a proportion of the national budget has declined.

Total direct transfers to LGs versus the National Budget for the period 2010/11-2014/15



Source: LG Final Accounts

Limited financing to local governments has been exacerbated by the continuous increase in the number of districts. . In 1997 when Local Government Act was passed and decentralisation programme launched, there were only 45 districts in Uganda; as of 1 July 2017, this number had increased to 121.[1]

Limited funding for local service delivery is also exacerbated by population growth. As Uganda's population continues to grow rapidly at 3 per cent per annum, there is increasing stress on public services such as schools, health centres, water sources etc. While the districts are receiving less money, they are, on the other hand, having to serve more people.

As a result, public services such as schools and health centres are crowded and unable to meet growing demand.

1 See Ministry of Local Government Fact Sheet. Available at https://www.molg.go.ug/sites/default/files/Ministry%20of%20Local%20Government%20 Fact%20Sheet_1.pdf. Accessed October 14, 2017.

Besides population growth, climate change presents an unprecedented challenge to local governments. The assessment was conducted at a time when the Teso and Karamoja sub-regions (like several other parts of Uganda) were barely recovering from a hard-hitting famine. The famine had been caused by a long dry spell that had had catastrophic effects on food production. Owing to its effect on food production, climate change has a strong impact on the district local economies and, by extension, the collection of local revenue.

In addition to the long drought, the invasion of the armyworm in the crop-farming Teso sub-region presented an unprecedented constraint on cereal production, thereby creating a new food security risk. The districts did not have the financial capacity to respond to the armyworm invasion. They could neither provide much needed pesticides to farmers nor facilitate agricultural extension workers to educate communities on how to deal with the armyworms.

Distortionary national-level priorities can stress limited local government resources. A case in point are the presidential pledges and directives from the President's Office. In Napak district, for example, a building that housed part of the district administration offices was turned into a presidential lodge without the district receiving a replacement or funds to put up one. In Katakwi, the president pledged a bus to one of the schools in the district and the district authorities were asked to provide for the bus in their budget.

Decentralised planning and resource allocation remains a myth as the districts have no real powers. The idea of decentralisation suggests that decision-making, including financial decisions, are made by local officials who are closer to the people and understand local circumstances and needs better. However, with the district budgets being dictated by nationally set limits in the IPFs, the power of districts is very limited. This constraint extends to the recruitment of essential staff. As long the districts have limited powers in the allocation of resources, the value of well-intentioned processes like the harmonised planning and the budget conferences is called into question.

Remote districts remain less attractive to highly qualified staff, making the districts unable to fill certain positions. Staffing positions may exist but the rural districts assessed remain unattractive to those seeking employment. This leads to: (a) people taking up positions, e.g. in education and health, only to use them as a stepping stone for a possible transfer to another preferred areas/district; (b) jobs that are advertised not attracting applicants.

Recommendations

Based on the findings from the DPRM exercise, the study makes targeted recommendations towards a) policy change by government; b) management practices at national and local government levels; and c) advocacy efforts by CSOs particularly to ensure that the desired changes can be achieved.

i. **Moving towards a real decentralised system where local government units have real decision-making powers**. In the short term, this could start with the district development plans guiding the IPFs from the Ministry of Finance. In the long term, however, change of the legal framework is necessary to transfer more powers to local governments.

ii. **Increasing funding for local governments** is necessary to enable districts to meet expectations in the delivery of public goods and services. The realistic target should be to have central government transfers to local governments that are proportionate to the increase in the size of the national budget.

iii. **Recognising and facilitating local councils to fulfil their mandates.** This is important to ensure that the people's elected representatives access the resources to fulfil their roles and responsibilities, including having adequate meetings of the councils and citizen consultations.

iv. **Strengthening citizen-state bargaining at local level.** There is need for a more structured engagement between citizens on local development. This framework ought to be underlined by structured bargains between the technocratic society, political society and civil society in the districts, to regularly discuss issues of governance, accountability and service delivery.

v. **Consolidation of data collection for evidence-based planning.** Strengthening of data collection and the use of data in local government planning and service delivery is key. Operationalising M&E will also require capacity-building for the district planning units.

vi. **Affirmative action for poor rural districts**. Poor districts require a degree of affirmative action in order to address the geographical equalities that underline service delivery in Uganda. Government programmes such as the Peace Recovery and Development Programme (PRDP) have played a critical role, although several gaps remain. With the introduction of DDEG, an opportunity exists for strengthening the financing of poorly resourced districts.

vii. **Operationalising District Integrity Promotion Forums (DIPFs).** The DIPFs can play a crucial role in following up on issues of accountability and service delivery. Local authorities need to adopt innovative ways of ensuring that the DIPFs function even when special funding for their activities have not been realised.

viii. **Co-ordination with civil society**. Proper co-ordination will, among other things, ensure the following: a) that the district authorities can provide quality control over the services delivered by NGOs; b) that NGO advocacy reaches supply-side decision-makers in local governments; c) that the risk of duplication between the work of the district and that of NGOs is mitigated; and d) that NGOs are held to account.

ix. **Strengthening monitoring, evaluation and reporting.** If districts are to learn from their experiences and improve the way they do things, effective monitoring and evaluation processes will be key. The possibility to pursue effective M&E is linked with strengthening the capacity of district planning units.

x. **Increasing staff supervision practices.** There were considerable concerns that some staff at service delivery units, including health centres and schools, are not working for full hours as per their contracts. Local authorities need to ensure that civil service employment regulations are respected.

xi. **Emphasising local economic development.** The future of a functional decentralisation system in part lies with stimulating local economies. For this reason, investing in key sectors such as agriculture, which dominates economic activity in the rural districts, is key. Efforts to ensure local content in projects require an integrated local population skilling approach to ensure that local people can incrementally transition from casual jobs to professional ones.

Introduction

The District Peer Review Mechanism (DPRM) assesses specific aspects of governance at the district level. It is a participative process which blends self-assessment by leaders in a given district with a peer review by contemporaries from other districts. Results of the DPRM assessment must be construed as the perspectives of local government leaders about the functioning of their districts. The assessment reveals a stark contradiction between the perspectives of duty bearers who have a highly positive ranking of the state of accountability and service delivery in their districts, on one side, and the evidence in terms of weak service delivery outcomes, on the other.

As an assessment tool, the DPRM can be applied in different ways to study specific aspects of local governance. The UDN-facilitated process specifically focused on accountability and service delivery. It covered the three districts of Amuria, Katakwi and Napak. The overall goal of the study was to identify realistic entry points for strengthening accountability and service delivery at local level. The study was guided by three overarching questions: (a) What is the state of accountability and service delivery? (b) What are the explanations for this state? and (c) How can service delivery and accountability in local governments be strengthened? The intervention logic is presented in Figure 2.



Figure 2: The intervention logic

The idea of a local government self-assessment and peer review is inspired by similar efforts at the African continent level, notably the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). This specific initiative by UDN also builds on an earlier related DPRM process conducted by the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS), whose results were published in 2013.

Accountability and service delivery take centre stage in the UDN-facilitated assessment. The two aspects lie at the centre of the quantity and quality of social services as well as the success of local development programmes. At UDN, the DPRM complements other local-level initiatives, particularly the Community Based Monitoring and Evaluation Systems (CBMES), which facilitate citizens' participation in the accountability and service delivery chain.

The DPRM primarily focused on supply-side stakeholders. These included public authorities in the form of elected and appointed political leaders as well as the district technical staff. The study emphasised getting deeper insight from public authorities on the state of accountability and service delivery and what they considered to be the proximate explanations for that state. Nevertheless, demand-side stakeholders, such as civil society actors and media representatives, were involved in the assessment.

1.1 Background

The state of service delivery and accountability dominates discourse about governance and development in Uganda. Corruption as a proxy for weak accountability is one of the major challenges to Uganda's development, which is linked to poor delivery of social services. Within the international context, Uganda is one of the countries perceived to have high rates of corruption, ranking 151 (of 176) countries assessed in Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index of 2016[2] (where 1 is least corrupt and 176 is most corrupt). In its biannual report to Parliament (July – December 2016), the Inspectorate of Government (IG, 2016:7) reported 1,519 corruption-related complaints received in the previous six-month period and 1,140 of these emerged from local governments.[3] A paper by the Afrobarometter observes that the effects of corruption in Uganda 'stretch from sub-standard public services through to elections and the judiciary to stunted economic development' (Kaweza M.J., 2016:1).[4]

Key facts:

- Uganda has a high ranking, 151 of 176 countries assessed in Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index
- 1,140 of 1,519 corruption-related complaints received by the Inspectorate of Government emerged from local governments
- 10 million Ugandans (27 per cent) of the population live in poverty
- Half of the school-age children in Karamoja have never attended school
- Citizens have less preference for public health facilities
- Uganda's social development is underlined by high levels of regional inequality
- The poverty rate in Karamoja is twice (60.8%) as much as the national average (27%)
- The quality of life as measured by UNDP's Human Development Index is low for Ugandans, with an HDI of 0.493.
- 77 per cent of Ugandans aged 15 – 29 have only completed primary school education or have not

The most recent (2016/2017) Uganda National Household Survey (UNHS) statistics confirm the deplorable state of social services and social development in Uganda. More than 10 million people (27 per cent of the population)[5] live in poverty, reflecting a 7 per cent rise from 19.7 per cent in 2012/2013. According to the Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 'the increase in poverty was more evident in the eastern region…' (UBOS, 2017: xi). Two of the DPRM districts (Amuria and Katakwi) are located in the eastern region.

[2] See Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index, 2016. Available at: https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016?gclid=EAIaIQobChMIlPrj57_51gIVARbTCh1EVA5mEAAYASAAEgI0MPD_BwE#table. Accessed on October 18, 2017.

[3] Inspectorate of Government, 2016. Biannual Inspectorate of Government Report to Parliament, July – December 2016.

The UNHS also reveals that about half of school-age children in Karamoja (location of Napak) had never attended school. The education sector is broadly characterised by staggering drop-out rates. Despite seemingly high enrolment levels at primary level, a 2015 survey by UBOS established that 77 per cent of young people aged 15 – 29 years had only completed primary education or had not.[6] National-level health sector statics show that public health centres are less utilised by citizens (only 34 per cent visit public health centres compared to 48 per cent who visit private centres). Overall, the quality of life among Ugandans remains poor: Uganda has a poor ranking on UNDP's Human Development Index (HDI) (163 of 185 countries ranked), with an HDI of 0.493 out of 1.[7]

Uganda's development is underlined by high levels of inequality. For example, the poverty rate in Teso is at 40.5 per cent while that of Karamoja is 60.8 per cent, which shows that both regions where the assessment was conducted were way above the national average. This trend is reflected in the access to and quality of services in education, transport and energy, to mention a few. In light of the regional inequalities, the UDN-facilitated DPRM focused on being context-specific by treating each district as a unique entity that faces specific challenges and opportunities regarding accountability and service delivery.

Is Decentralisation the Answer?

The practice of decentralised governance has always been part of pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial Uganda. However, a more structured form of local governance can be traced from government's decentralisation reform of 1993 which had its roots in the enactment of the Local Government Act (1997). According to the Ministry of Local Government (MoLG), the overarching rationale for the decentralisation reform was to contribute to the government policy of achieving social and political harmony, enhance economic growth and alleviate poverty.[8] The reformed decentralisation system adopted in 1997 has the following policy objectives:

- To transfer real power to local governments and, thus, reduce the workload on remote and under-resourced central officials;
- To bring political and administrative control over services to actual delivery points, thereby improving accountability and effectiveness, and promoting people's feelings of ownership of programmes executed in their respective local governments;
- To free local managers from central constraints and, among other things, allow them to develop organisational structures tailored to local circumstances;
- To improve financial accountability and responsibility by establishing a clear link between payment of taxes and provision of services and
- To improve the capacities of the councils to plan, finance and manage the delivery of services to their respective constituents.
- To promote Local Economic Development (LED) in order to enhance people's incomes.

[5] Uganda National Household Survey (UNHS) 2016/2017.
[6] Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2015. Results of the School to Work Transition Survey, 2015.
[7] UNDP Human Development Report, 2016.

It is 20 years in 2017 since the decentralisation reform of 1997 was launched. At the time the 1997 Local Government Act was enacted, there were only 45 districts in Uganda; and as of 1 July 2017, this number had increased to 121.[9] Exponentially increasing district units has been the hallmark of Uganda's decentralisation reform.

The policy objectives of Uganda's 'new' and reformed decentralisationsystemostensibly set the stage for inclusive local development that responds to local challenges and needs. However, 20 years later, several challenges remain: real decision-making power is yet to be experienced within local governments. National-level authorities directly control resource allocation and, to a considerable degree, the management of local development projects and services. In addition, financial accountability is a major challenge in local governments as it to Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) of the central government, local councils are severely under-facilitated and, therefore, incapacitated, and local economies remain weak and predominantly subsistence.

1.2 Objective

The DPRM is aimed at building a contextualised understanding of the state of accountability and service delivery at local government level, and the explanations for that state. This study focused on identifying district-specific circumstances affecting accountability and service delivery outcomes. The DPRM differs from other assessments in the sense that it is participative and a process of continuous learning from the knowledge and experiences of peers. Participants in the DPRM are trained about the legal provisions and expected standards of accountability service delivery and they apply this knowledge to assess and rank their districts. They also get to learn first-hand about the functionality of specific processes through interactions with duty bearers and beneficiaries of local development programmes.

Rationale

The idea behind the DPRM is that when local stakeholders take centre stage in the process of governance assessment, they learn first-hand about what works and what does not work. In this way, the assessment is a learning process about local governance generally and the feasibility of specific rules, systems and processes. Secondly, assessment findings and recommendations are more acceptable when local decision-makers lead the process of assessment. Furthermore, assessment recommendations are more realistic as they are generated by people with a better understanding of local constraints and opportunities.

The comparative scoring of districts in similar contexts provides information to citizens about the performance of local government institutions. On the one hand, this is expected to spur the demand side for improved service delivery. On the other hand, it offers an incentive to improve performance on the part of leaders who are interested in strengthening their reputation among citizens. The DPRM thus acts as an incentive framework for leaders to pursue policies that meet people's aspirations.

[8] See Ministry of Local Government. Available at https://www.molg.go.ug/content/about-us. Accessed on October 4, 2017.
[9] See Ministry of Local Government Fact Sheet. Available at https://www.molg.go.ug/sites/default/files/Ministry%20of%20Local%20Government%20Fact%20Sheet_1.pdf. Accessed October 14, 2017.

The DPRM generates evidence and includes dialogue that puts local governance at the centre of the national development discourse. Following the publication of the DPRM findings, UDN will facilitate dialogues at district and national levels where key issues concerning accountability and service delivery at the district level will be discussed. These discussions are essential to informing and inspiring action towards necessary change at local and national levels.

The DPRM helps to explore the veracity of the rationale for decentralisation. Support for decentralisation includes the arguments that it improves local democracy and development, increases efficiency and promotes participation in decision-making, engenders pro-poor policies and increases accountability. The assessment provides evidence on the extent to which Uganda's decentralisation system has contributed to improving accountability and service delivery at local level. The DPRM report is expected to inform ongoing debates about governance and models for public service delivery in Uganda.

At policy level, the assessment was underpinned by the recognition that decentralisation is a key framework in Uganda's governance. Since the 1997 adoption of decentralisation, local government units have become key agencies in the delivery of public goods and services. This well-intentioned initiative, however, needs to be supported by continuous learning, part of which can be achieved through regularly assessing the progress and challenges of decentralisation. The DPRM methodology ensures that a local governance assessment is not just a technocratic undertaking where external experts impose their knowledge and perspectives on local processes but, rather, a locally led iterative enquiry into the conditions of and explanations for the state of accountability and service delivery in a district.

1.3 Methodology

Assessment Area

The DPRM was conducted in the three districts of Amuria, Katakwi and Napak in north-eastern Uganda. The choice of the three districts was informed by a deliberate target by UDN to reach out to remote and under-served areas. UDN recognises that the majority of Ugandans live in rural areas where they face significant challenges in accessing social services. UDN aims to bring the plight of such under-served communities to the centre of debates on service delivery and development.

Assessment Period

Data collection activities were conducted between July and August 2017. However, the overall assessment process took a longer period, starting with districts pre-visits in March 2017, the identification of indicators in April and the training of assessors in May. The validation of a draft report was conducted in each district in September.

Figure 1: Amuria District Statistician Emmanuel Okiror Submitting during the DPRM Draft Report Validation Meeting

The assessment focused on the 2015/2016 financial year. At the time of the assessment this was the latest completed financial year for which the accountability cycle covering planning, budgeting, implementation and reporting was expected to be available. However, for depth of analysis, evidence from other financial years is applied in certain instances where necessary.

Data Collection and Analysis

The two-stage research process involved a self-assessment and inter-district peer review. The self-assessment involved stakeholders from a given district conducting an assessment within their own district, e.g. assessors from Katakwi district assessing Katakwi. The inter-district peer review visits involved a combination of assessors from all districts forming themselves into inter-district peer review teams, and then each team taking up one district. A total of three inter-district peer review teams were formed to cover the three districts under the assessment. Each team was constituted by two assessors from each district, making a total of six assessors per peer review team. (See Appendix for Assessment Team Details).

Table 4: Composition of inter-district assessment teams

Amuria	Katakwi	Napak
2 assessors from Amuria	2 assessors from Katakwi	2 assessors from Napak
2 assessors from Katakwi	2 assessors from Napak	2 assessors from Amuria
2 assessors from Napak	2 assessors from Amuria	2 assessors from Katakwi

Methods of data collection

The DPRM enquiry primarily applied qualitative research methods supplemented with a quantitative review of available statistics. The qualitative research design was preferred because the enquiry necessitated getting a deeper understanding of the underlying dynamics around accountability and service delivery in the districts. Qualitative data collection techniques allow for exploring intensively and extensively and digging deeper into a situation, phenomenon, issue or problem. Furthermore, the qualitative data collection techniques provide varied and in-depth information and are best suited for identifying diversity and variety (Kumar, 2014). Therefore, the data collection methods used for the DPRM include:

Inter District Peer Review Assessment Team inspects Marram Road graded by Amuria DLG

(i) A review of documents relating to accountability and service delivery in the districts. Examples of documents reviewed include minutes of the district council and committee meetings, district staffing registers, district annual work plans, budgets and reports, to mention but a few.

(ii) Interviews with district stakeholders. The respondents were purposively selected in view of their roles within the district accountability and service delivery chain. They included key district staff and political leaders as well as civil society representatives, including media actors. Examples of respondents include Chief Administrative Officers (CAOs), Procurement Officers (POs), District Engineers, Clerk to Council, Resident District Commissioners (RDCs), district chairpersons, District Speakers, members of District Public Accounts Committees (DPACs) and civil society representatives, to mention but a few.

(iii) Site visits. The assessors visited selected service delivery points such as schools, roads and hospitals. The visits were intended to validate the information obtained from the interviews and the documentary review. The site visits involved the physical observation of service delivery points as well as interaction with service point providers and beneficiaries.

Evidence generated from the qualitative research was used to inform a quantitative score. The score represents a ranking of the state of an indicator against a norm or standard. The scores were awarded by the assessors based on their conclusions on the evidence gathered through interviews, documentary reviews and site visits. Thus, the assessors were the decisive judges in the DPRM exercise.

DPRM assessors during a scoring process in Amuria

Each aspect of the assessment (i.e. accountability or service delivery) was divided into different assessment areas. An assessment area (see Table 2) represents specific attributes needed for the accountability and service delivery system to function, for example sound budget process, management capability, and citizen participation, to mention but a few.

ASSESSMENT ASPECT	ASSESSMENT AREA
Accountability	Sound budget process Comprehensive accountability system Management capability Citizen participation Separation of powers Anti-corruption
Service delivery	Resource capacity Management capability Service orientation Quantity and quality increase Citizen participation

Table 4: Areas and topics of assessment

Each assessment area was measured through specific indicators. Indicators are normative statements against which the condition or state of something is measured (the DPRM focused on indicators for the different assessment areas under accountability or service delivery). The use of normative indicators draws on UNDPs guide on conducting local government assessments (UNDP, 2010) and the initial intervention by the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung that conducted the first DPRM exercise in Uganda (KAS, 2013).

The DPRM scores rank each indicator on a scale of 0 – 10, with zero being the lowest score and 10 being the highest score. In this report, the district score on an indicator represents the average of scores awarded by all assessors for a given indicator. On the other hand, scores for an assessment area represent the average of the scores for all indicators under that area, while the score for an assessment aspect is the average of scores of all assessment areas under the respective aspect, i.e. accountability and service delivery respectively.



Figure 3: The DPRM scores

1.4 Study Limitations

Participants in the DPRM were primarily supply-side stakeholders. The idea of a self-assessment makes sense to the extent that it enables presentation of the unfiltered perspectives of local decision-makers. It is, however, prone to bias. For example, when asked about the existing constraints on service delivery and accountability, participants are more likely to consider any other factors except their own practices or limitations. This was experienced in most interviews where the tendency was to attribute the existing challenges to central government policies and practices with little focus on how the districts themselves were managed. Evidence from the interviews, therefore, may not highlight the full extent of the problem, particularly with regard to management practices at the district level. In order to deal with this potential bias, the analysis of findings also relies on evidence from the physical verification of social services as well as other independent surveys and assessments.

The scores as awarded by the local stakeholders (assessors) were final. The scores are based on the assessors' own interpretation of the state of affairs in the districts. The composition of assessment teams included a blend of political leaders, civil society actors, technical staff and representatives of security departments (from the offices of the District Internal Security Officers). This constellation potentially suffers the risk that assessors may feel the need to award 'acceptable' scores for fear of perceived possible personal ramifications in the event of a critical assessment. Although none of the assessors highlighted this as a challenge, the analysis team could not rule it out completely. This may explain why the scores generally high even where indicators for physical evidence suggested poor outcomes. Therefore, the results of this study should be understood beyond the scores. The analysis presents details of the evidence established from multiple sources. For the future, a multiple scoring criterion is being considered.

This DPRM focused mostly on stakeholders on the supply side of accountability and service delivery. Demand-side voices are, therefore, relatively limited. Although efforts were made to include service delivery beneficiaries, budget limitations could not allow a deeper enquiry for this category of participants. The study nevertheless relied on surveys by other actors and official data on service delivery to triangulate information provided by the district authorities.

3. Findings

Findings from the DPRM are presented following the two assessment aspects in turn, starting with accountability, followed by service delivery. The presentation, furthermore, follows specific assessment areas, starting with the scores, followed by the analysis. As earlier mentioned in this report, the scores reflect the perspectives of district level stakeholders, mostly duty bearers. Thus, a high score alone may not imply a for the status of accountability or service delivery in a district is good and vice versa. The scores have to be interpreted alongside the analysis which triangulates the awarded scores with evidence from site visits and available literature.

3.1 Accountability

There are various forms of assessing accountability, some of which overlap. For purposes of the DPRM assessment, the following areas were considered to examine the state of accountability:

- The existence of a sound budget process
- The availability and use of a comprehensive accountability system
- The management capability of the district
- The level of citizen participation; separation of powers
- The anti-corruption policies and practices.

3.1.1 Sound budget process

A sound budget process is a prerequisite for probity in public management. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 'a sound budgeting system is one which engenders trust among citizens that government, in the broad sense, is listening to their concerns, has a plan for achieving worthwhile objectives, and will use the available resources effectively, efficiently and in a sustainable manner' (2014:1). Drawing on this broad definition, the DPRM assessment of a sound budget process considered the level of citizen participation to determine whether people's concerns are communicated and considered in the budget process. Furthermore, in line with the goals of Uganda's decentralisation policy, especially the transfer of real power to local administrators and local councils, we assess the extent to which district councils determine the allocation of resources through the budget and the contribution of different district departments to the budgeting process. Table 3 shows the details of the indicators applied in assessing the budget process as well as the scores obtained by each district.

Table 5: Scores for Sound Budget Process Indicators

Indicators	**Amuria**	**Katakwi**	**Napak**	**District average**
District holds annual budget conferences during which expected revenues and expenditures are discussed	9.6	9.3	9.4	9.4
Different district departments contribute to budgeting processes	8.9	9.7	9.2	9.2
The district council considers and approves the budget	9.6	9.2	9.7	9.5
Reported expenditures are consistent with the approved budget	8.8	8.7	8.2	8.5

As indicated in the Table above, all the assessed districts registered high scores for the indicators under accountability. The main explanation by the assessors for these scores across all districts was that the districts follow the mandatory steps in budgeting. These include a participatory budget conference involving all stakeholders as well as the contribution of the different district departments in developing the budget framework papers.

It was, for example, reported in Katakwi district that budget conferences are well attended, that the most recent one ‘had to be conducted in a bigger hall at a school as the district headquarters did not have a room with the capacity to accommodate the high number of people that turned up for the conference’ (interview with a technical official, Katakwi district). It should be noted, however, that Katakwi district has a very small meeting room that is considered insufficient even for council meetings. In Amuria district, it was reported that the budget conferences are mostly attended by officials who receive written invitations. Citizen participation was reportedly low owing to low publicity of the conferences (results validation meeting Amuria district).

The largest meeting room (Council Hall) in Katakwi DLG is too small to host the entire council, let alone the budget conferences

Public meetings in the districts, including budget conferences, are male-dominated. The low levels of female participation are linked with the prevailing gender imbalances in the districts. It reflects relatively lower levels of female representation on local councils, in district technical positions and other official roles, for example as RDCs, senior police officers, and civil society actors, to mention but a few. According to the MoLG local government factsheet, women constitute only 12 per cent of Chief Administrative Officers, and 8 per cent of Deputy Chief Administrative Officers. The factsheet also reveals that 100 per cent of 22 filled positions for Town Clerk are occupied by men. The under-representation of women in public roles is reflected in appointive positions such as RDCs, District Police Commanders (DPCs) and District Internal Security Officers (DISOs). Given that women are under-represented in official roles, they are less likely to receive formal invitations to the budget conferences and are also more likely not to receive any information about the budget conferences.

The district councils fulfil their statutory function of approving the budget. It was, however, reported that limited time is provided for councillors to scrutinise and debate the budget. In Amuria and Katakwi districts, for example, the councillors indicated that they did not get the opportunity to review and discuss the planned budget before passing it. A respondent reported that ‘only a few people get the opportunity to speak on the budget and are given very little time…. it is expected that discussions on the budget take place in specific standing committees. However, as councillors, it is still necessary to review and debate the final document that is laid before council….’ For this reason, the district councils are not able to cause changes to the planned budgets. Technical officers appreciate the limited time available for the councillors to debate district affairs generally and the budget in particular. They attribute this challenge to limited funding whereby only a few meetings of the councils can be held across the financial year. This challenge is exacerbated by the fact that council meetings begin relatively late, leaving limited time for discussion and yet business cannot be adjourned to subsequent days, given that doing so would have financial implications.

Budget-related discourses at the district level had limited or no influence on the allocation of funds. The budgeting process represents one of the strong indicators of recentralisation in Uganda’s local governance process. The largest percentage of funds available to districts were conditional grants from the central government (the centre). The specific lines of expenditure were pre-determined by the centre. Before the districts started on the budgeting process, the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MoFPED) provided IPFs detailing the overall financial resource allocation to the district and the distribution to different sectors. A respondent from Katakwi remarked that the districts have ‘limited real power in the allocation of funds’ as ‘you cannot budget outside the IPFs’. Another respondent from Amuria concluded that ‘we are more of consumers of what is provided.’ This reality calls into question the value of elaborate planning processes like the budget conferences. There is, for example, no evidence of a connection between the district level harmonised planning process – which requires planning to start at the village level – and the IPFs from the MoFPED.

While district-level stakeholders supported high scores for the budget process in the districts, a number of constraints undermine the possibility of a sound budget system. **These include:**

- Any issues raised by citizens do not impact on the budget where allocations are determined at the national level through the IPFs. The budget process is in essence not participatory.
- Local officials do not have real power as espoused in the decentralisation policy. They only have to adapt to nationally determined allocations as indicated in the IPFs.
- The roles of local councils are significantly curtailed as meetings are rushed and councillors not given ample time to scrutinise and debate the budgets.

3.1.2 Comprehensive Accountability System

A comprehensive accountability system must address the management of public expenditure and the utilisation of public resources and assets. Given that the DPRM concerns the delivery of public goods and services, district accountability systems were also assessed on the extent to which they hold the private sector and civil society service providers to account. The requirements for districts to manage a comprehensive system for accountability include knowledge of the legal framework for accountability and the application of appropriate laws. This assessment area also examined whether the procurement and disposal processes in the districts were consistent with the law.

Table 6: Scores for the indicators under a sound budget process

Indicators	Amuria	Katakwi	Napak	District average
District council members and technical staff are aware of and refer to laws governing local government accountability	9.6	8.5	9.1	9.1
District procurement and disposal processes are consistent with public sector guidelines	9.4	8.6	8.7	8.9
District has and applies a mechanism that regulates and holds private sector actors to account	7.9	7.6	8.0	7.8
District has a mechanism that regulates and holds civil society actors to account	9.3	8.0	8.5	8.6
Information (including financial information) is readily available and accessible	9.0	8.3	7.8	8.4

All three districts registered high scores on their accountability systems. The assessors attributed these scores to the fact that the interviewed officials demonstrated knowledge of relevant laws, such as the 2015 Public Finance Management Act, the Local Government Act and the Anti-Corruption Act (2009), and that these laws were being implemented. The assessors also cited evidence that financial information is widely disseminated, including on noticeboards at the district as well as sub-county headquarters.

Procurement processes are handled through the District Procurement Committee (DCC) and are based on a procurement plan. Similarly, the disposal of assets is based on a pre-assessment by a board of survey. Assets are disposed of through a public bidding process based on valuation by an official from the central government. Interviews with the procurement officials provided details of an elaborate procurement process in the districts. The Katakwi district Procurement Officer summarised the process as follows:

> We start with developing a procurement plan, which is based on the needs of all departments that have been provided for in the budget. An evaluation committee is identified before any tender is advertised. All tenders are publicly advertised and the bids are received, recorded and opened in a transparent manner. The procurement committee makes a final decision and communicates to the accounting officer (CAO). A procurement decision is communicated publicly by the CAO and time is allowed for any dissatisfied bidder to lodge a complaint before the winner is awarded the contract.

All the districts have in place lists of prequalified firms and tenders are publicly advertised.

The interviewed procurement officials did not report interference in the conduct of their duties. The study, however, did not analyse the political economy surrounding local government procurement and expenditure. Several issues can be of interest in this regard. For example, the fact that members of the DCC are nominated by the CAO before appointment by MoFPED can have implications for the alignment of interests and incentives in the procurement decision-making process. Similarly, members of the Local Government Accounts Committees (commonly known as DPACs) are nominated by the District Executive Committee which can have an influence on how they treat possible queries that can potentially implicate DEC members.

Political influence over procurement decisions (DCC) and financial scrutiny (DPAC) can potentially pass unreported. In Napak district, it was reported that contractors who were sourced by the central government, for example through the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM), were largely ‘untouchables’ before local government officials. Such contractors were reported to often refer to high-ranking government officials whenever local authorities raised questions regarding their work. In one instance referred to, national-level authorities were said to have directed the district to make 80 per cent payment to a contractor who had delivered less than 20 per cent of the contractual work (results dissemination meeting, Napak).

Such unexplored dynamics may explain why, while the districts are seen to be complying with statutory requirements, serious accountability gaps remain. There is a mismatch between the fact that districts follow outlined procedures and accountability outcomes. For example, while procurement for projects follows an elaborate process, the assessment teams found infrastructure projects that were falling apart, e.g. new teachers’ houses that had developed cracks within just two years of commissioning.



Kangole Primary School teachers' houses block in Napak district has developed major cracks just two years after OPM handed over the project. Below is a classroom block at the same school built in the 1970s but that had not yet developed any cracks

The local authorities in Napak district initially suggested that some of the cracks emerged owing to seismic activity. However, further investigations revealed that the assessed districts do not lie in a seismic zone. In any case, the weakness of the seismic explanation lies in the fact that the new building that had developed major cracks exists beside relatively old structures, some of which were reportedly constructed as far back as the 1970s. The old buildings have not developed any cracks.

Kangole Primary School building in Napak was reportedly constructed in the 1970S and stands strong without any cracks to date. It is just adjacent to the new block that has developed major cracks two years after completion

The poor quality of new buildings suggests that contractors can get away with poor quality or shoddy work. Several explanations were advanced for this phenomenon. While the interviewed district officials suggested that the responsible officials were failing in their supervisory mandate, end-user beneficiaries pointed to the possibility that supervisors can deliberately collude with contractors for personal benefit. In Napak district, for example, there were observations that a former leader of the technical team had been nicknamed 'Mr Kickbacks', alluding to allegations that he often solicited kickbacks from contractors and staff. He was reportedly removed from the district for the same reason.

A second example of weak accountability outcomes in the districts relates to inability to account for cash advances made to local government officials. A deeper review of DPAC reports revealed cases where accountability returns of advances were not made in time or had not been made at all. Even when the internal and external audits identified the anomalies and recommended recovery of the funds, the latest DPAC reports show that the audit recommendations were yet to be implemented.

There are considerable gaps regarding the supervision and monitoring of projects. The procurement units handle the contracting process but the supervision of projects is expected to be performed by a project manager typically identified from the user unit (the sector/department of the district for which the procurement is made). However, the respondents stated that user units delay in identifying and assigning project managers as well as in providing project progress reports. The consequence of this was that unscrupulous contractors could get away with poor quality or shoddy work.

The ability of districts to hold the private sector to account is weak. District authorities reported having a limited mandate as the mandate of managing the standards of private sector goods lies with the Uganda National Bureau of Standards (UNBS). However, local governments on their part license providers of such services as restaurants, drug stores, local shops etc. Private service providers of education (private schools) and health (private clinics and drug stores) are registered by the district and are supposed to be regularly supervised by the education and health inspectors, respectively. However, the limited funds available for inspection services has made inspectors unable to regularly follow up and hold the private sector to account.



Figure 2: Napak Chief Finance Officer meets Assessment team. Right behind him is a crack that permeates most offices of the Administrative Block built by Central Government less than 5 years before- See Commissioning Plaque inset.

With a few exceptions, local authorities are concerned that NGOs are not providing up-to-date information about their work. NGOs operating in a district are required by law to register with the district. They are furthermore obliged to file annual work plans and budgets as well as their financial and narrative reports with the district Community Development Office (CDO). However, although the CDOs maintain an NGO register, they are not confident with regard to whether all NGOs have provided the necessary up-to-date information. Therefore, there is limited data at the district level regarding the amount of funds NGOs are receiving and spending in the districts as well as the details of NGOs' activities. A respondent from Napak district described the NGO policy as 'weak' and that 'NGOs are good at criticising government yet they, too, are not transparent and accountable.' He furthermore remarked:

> There are over 80 CSOs in the district, but I don't even know some of them…some are based in Kampala but only come to Napak to get approval from the CAO…NGOs give you only their work plans but not their budgets.

Exceptions regarding NGO reporting were made for international organisations, including the German organisation GIZ and UN agencies such as the United Nations Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), which provide budget support to the districts and are involved in the delivery of social services. Advocacy-oriented NGOs are relatively less acknowledged, probably because they focus on demanding accountability from district authorities as opposed to contributing financially to cash-strapped districts.

Besides the fact that most NGOs are not providing adequate information, weak monitoring capacities on the part of the districts make it difficult to follow up on and monitor NGO activities. Although district officials are often invited and take part in NGO activities, there is no evidence to suggest that the officials verify the content of the information and the qualifications of the providers engaged.

Figure 3: Health Centre 2 Constructed in Napak District by Drylands, an international NGO

Despite the high scores, the accountability system in the districts face several limitations, including:

- Poor quality of public works
- Poor monitoring and supervision of works
- Contractors are getting away with shoddy work
- Districts have limited capacity to monitor NGOs
- Conflict of powers between district and national government officials
- Limited or delayed action on DPAC reports
- Limited monitoring services provided by private sector actors
- Potential conflict of interest, given the way DCCs and DPACs are appointed

3.1.3 Management Capability

This assessment views district administration as a collection of capabilities to manage public resources and deliver public goods and services. With regard to accountability, the assessment of management capability focused on the existence of key personnel and organs for handling financial and accountability matters. This includes the existence of substantive[10] officials in key positions, such as the CAO, the Internal Auditor (IA), the CFO and the PO, to mention but a few. It also measures the functioning and existence of critical committees, particularly the local government accounts committee, commonly referred to as the DPAC, the DCC, and the District Service Commission (DSC). Finally, the assessment area measures whether information from audits is discussed and acted upon.

Table 7: Scores for Indicators under Management Capability

Indicators	Amuria	Katakwi	Napak	Districts average
All staffing positions relating to financial management are substantively filled	6.1	8.2	6.5	6.9
District has a fully constituted and functional District Public Accounts Committee (DPAC)	8.4	9.4	6.9	8.2
District has a fully constituted and functional District Contracts Committee (DCC)	9.0	9.5	8.5	9.0
District has a fully constituted and functional District Service Commission (DSC)	9.2	9.4	9.8	9.4
Information from audits and reviews is discussed and acted upon	8.9	9.4	8.3	8.9

10 This report urges that having in place substantive rather acting staff in key accountability positions is crucial to ensuring that staff fulfil their mandates with confidence as they will not have the need to appease appointing authorities to secure their positions.

Amuria and Napak districts registered low scores of 6.1 and 6.5 respectively concerning the filling of critical financial management positions. This was due to the fact that a considerable number of staff in the key positions were serving in an acting capacity. Overall, however, the districts registered good scores regarding management capability. Explanations for the high scores were attributed to the fact that critical committees such as the DCC, DPAC and DSC were constituted and operational, and, in the case of Katakwi district, key staff positions were substantively filled.

The lack of funds for salaries to recruit substantive staff was provided as the major explanation for lacking substantive staff. The districts require the allocation of funds from the MoFPED before staff recruitment can be conducted. However, the MoFPED often delays in providing this clearance. In Napak district, the personnel officer reported that 'most positions are not substantively filled' and that officials such as the CFO, IA, Health Officer (HO), PO and Natural Resource Officer (NRO) were serving in an acting capacity. At the time of the assessment, these positions had only been recently advertised. During the validation meeting, however, it was pointed out that the failure to fill staff positions may also be a result of inefficiencies in the recruitment process as the district has been failing to fully spend budget allocations under the salary vote.

Rural districts tend to be less attractive to applicants, especially in highly technical positions where qualified personnel may be in limited supply. This applies to professions such as engineers and doctors. In Katakwi district, it was reported that the job announcement for the position of district engineer did not attract a qualified applicant and the position had to be re-advertised. 'There are not so many people who want to work in these areas,' remarked the CAO. At the time of the study, the position was yet to be filled.

The DCC, DSC and DPAC are constituted across all three districts. Although the DCC and DPAC lacked one member in Amuria and Napak, this did not prevent the committees from proceeding with their duties, given that the minimum required quorum exists. The assessors found evidence that all district job awards were made through the DSC while procurements were handled through the DCC as required by law. Audit queries were discussed in the DPAC, which made recommendations to the district council and to the accounting officer. However, DPACs and DSCs were unable to meet regularly owing to financial limitations. 'We are not adequately funded to do this critical work,' remarked the DSC chairperson from Amuria.

A review of DPAC reports reveals that queries raised by the internal audit departments are not acted upon and resolved in time. Such queries mostly relate to non-accountability of funds by officials to whom such funds are dispensed. This could be an issue of negligence or limited capacity of the accounting officers and concerned officials to follow up on audit observation.

Besides personnel gaps, the districts also face infrastructural constraints that make financial management challenging. These include power outages and limited internet access, which makes it difficult for district officials to work with the newly introduced Financial Management Information Systems (FMIS). Difficulties with the FMIS transition were reportedly one of the major challenges affecting financial management in the districts. Banking services can only be accessed from neighbouring districts. The long distances to Kampala coupled with the poor road networks present additional challenges as some financial procedures demand the physical travel of accounting officers to the Ministry of Finance in Kampala.

Management capability of the districts is affected by a number of constraints, including:

- Inadequate budget provision to cover critical staff positions
- A limited budget to facilitate accountability committees
- Unexplained inaction on DPAC recommendations
- Infrastructural bottlenecks and challenges transiting to FMIS

3.1.4 Citizen Participation

Citizen participation considers the extent to which private individuals can influence public processes. For this assessment, citizen participation examined whether citizens are involved in the district accountability chain beyond attending budget conferences. The assessment area examined whether the districts have a mechanism for receiving citizens' feedback and whether feedback by citizens is acted upon. The assessment area specifically examined the participation of women, youth and persons with disabilities (PWDs) in accountability processes.

Table 8: Scores for Indicators under Citizen Participation

Indicators	Amuria	Katakwi	Napak	District average
There are channels for receiving and addressing formal and informal feedback from citizens on the actions and inactions of leaders	8.5	8.3	7.5	8.1
Citizen feedback is a basis for sanctions where cases of impropriety are concerned	8.1	9.0	8.3	8.4
The voices of women, youth, PWDs and children are solicited and taken into account	9.5	8.5	8.6	8.8

All three districts registered high scores under citizen participation. Explanations for the high scores relate to the existence of community engagement platforms, particularly the barazas, the presence of suggestion boxes and anti-corruption boxes at district headquarters, the existence of women, youth and disability councils and the representation of women, youth and PWDs on the district councils.

Community engagement meetings, locally known as barazas, present a platform for citizen engagement. Besides statutory processes like the budget conferences, barazas present a common platform for citizen-state conversations on issues of accountability and service delivery. The barazas provide a space for direct feedback between citizens and local authorities. In Amuria district, the DPRM team attended a baraza that coincided with the assessment exercise. The assessment team experienced first-hand the conversations in which citizens communicated their challenges and dissatisfactions while the leaders provided explanations.

Amuria district RDC addressed citizens during a baraza

The barazas are mostly organised by NGOs and this provides an example of civil society organisations (CSOs) and local authorities collaborating on issues of governance and accountability. An official from Amuria district reported that addressing the citizens' financial expectations was affecting participation in the barazas. In some areas, it was reported that citizens expected financial payouts such as transport refund as a condition for taking part in community meetings. This was blamed on NGOs that introduced financial incentives for people to take part in community discussions.

The conversations during barazas can be crucial to the district accountability chain. However, the baraza space is ostensibly dominated by citizens complaining, on one side, and local authorities explaining their actions, on the other. The assessment team did not find the existence of structured conversations in which the major constraints on accountability and service delivery were explored and a realistic way forward discussed. Furthermore, there is no system of guaranteeing that the resolutions reached and promises made at the barazas are implemented. If the barazas are going to impact on accountability and service delivery, these initiatives will need to be improved to ensure that the commitments made are realistic, documented and followed up on.

The existence of suggestion boxes and anti-corruption boxes is a laudable step towards enabling the anonymous relay of information about accountability. However, the ability of an individual citizen to use the suggestion boxes has two critical requirements: a) that one can write; and b) that one can access the district headquarters. These two requirements cannot be taken for granted in the predominantly rural districts assessed. Many citizens are still unable to read and write and the majority have never or rarely travel to the district headquarters. In this regard, supplementary mechanisms become necessary. However, other potential approaches, such as collecting citizen feedback through collaborations with CBOs, the use of mobile phones and leveraging other spaces for social co-operation (such as churches and mosques) were non-existent.

This Picture was taken near the Amuria DLG Notice Board. Inset (left), an anti-corruption suggestion box in Amuria district

The media, particularly radio, provides the main form of engagement with citizens. District officials, particularly those from the political leadership, often join in on radio talk shows where they discuss issues of accountability. In Katakwi district, the CAO indicated that local authorities are severally invited to join radio talk shows and this role is 'mostly taken up by the political leadership who are always provided [with] information by the technocrats.' Citizens, on their part, mostly participate in the radio programmes through call-ins. The interviewed media representatives indicated that they enjoy a cordial working relationship with local authorities. A correspondent of a major newspaper operating in Napak district testified thus:

> I have not had any restriction to do my job in all the seven years of my journalism service in Karamoja. When I hear cases of corruption, I go there and I get good information for accurate reporting. I go to the ground and conduct investigations unhindered. Here, the media is not sidelined. Due to this co-operation, I have even been able to investigate and I've written hard stories even about high-profile people.

Citizen participation in the accountability chain is primarily underpinned by engagement in barazas and the provision of suggestion boxes. The media plays a critical role of providing citizens with information and as a feedback mechanism. The following limitations still exist:

- The barazas are limited and do not present a platform for a structured discussion of the constraints on and opportunities for improving service delivery
- Suggestion boxes may be inaccessible to most local citizens
- Additional mechanisms for enlisting citizen feedback, such as the use of mobile phones and leveraging religious groupings as platforms for social co-operation, are not being exploited.

3.1.5 Separation of Powers

In political science the notion of separation of powers concerns the division of legislative, executive and judicial functions among different independent bodies of government. The DPRM applies the notion of separation of powers at local level to assess: a) the extent to which different power centres in the district, i.e. the technical staff, elected political leaders, and representatives of the central government, respect each other's mandates; and b) the extent to which the different power centres co-operate in public management within the district.

Table 9: Score for Indicators under Separation of Powers

Indicators	Amuria	Katakwi	Napak	District average
The political and technical arms of the district co-ordinate in a way that none sees the other as interfering in their mandate	8.1	6.6	7.7	7.5
Central government representatives (RDCs, DISO, DPC) co-ordinate with local government authorities in a way that none sees the other as interfering in their mandates	8.8	7.5	7.6	8.0

The three districts registered good scores regarding separation of powers. According to the assessors, a good degree of co-ordination exists between different authorities in the districts. The interviewed local authorities spoke positively of each other and expressed tht belief that they were according each body the necessary space to fulfil their functions. In Amuria, the only district where conflicts between the political leadership and technical staff were reported, an intervention by the Minister of Local Government enabled the warring parties to quickly resolve the differences and return to harmony. 'We had issues in our district last year, which prompted the minister to intervene. Currently we are working in harmony to build our district,' reported a respondent.

Elected political leaders, technical staff and the representatives of the central government make up three organs responsible for the management of district affairs. The heads of each of these organs constitute the District Management Committee (DEC) and the District Security Committee. This structure provides a starting point for co-ordination among them. The CAO, RDC, DPC and DISO are also ex-officio members of the District Council, which enables them to interact directly with the district policy processes. In both Katakwi and Amuria districts, the DIPFs have been set up to provide another platform for co-ordination among the top leadership of the districts. However, the DIPFs are non-functional.

It was, nevertheless, reported that friction at times emerges between the political and technical officers of particularly regarding the geographical allocation of projects such as roads, boreholes, school construction etc.

The evidence reveals a considerable degree of harmony between political and technical leaders in the districts. Existing differences have always been amicably resolved. Gaps were reported in the allocation of projects, as each elected councillor feels the need to secure a project for their areas. Increased dialogue between political and technical leaders is crucial to addressing this limitation.

3.1.6 Anti-Corruption

Anti-corruption considers any systems and practices that inhibit corruption. The anti-corruption assessment examined the extent to which the districts implement measures to oppose corruption and whether the districts exercise zero tolerance to corruption. The indicators assess whether corruption is widely discussed and castigated in the media and whether the districts have functional District Integrity Promotion Forums (DIPFs).

Table 10: Scores for Indicators under Anti-Corruption

Indicators	Amuria	Katakwi	Napak	District average
Cases of suspected corruption are expeditiously investigated and acted upon as required by law	8.8	9.3	8.4	8.8
Key district stakeholders on the leadership side (such as chairperson, councillors, technical staff, DPC, RDC, state attorney etc.) perceive the district leadership as practising zero tolerance to corruption	7.5	6.1	7.6	7.1
Citizens in the district are perceived to be non-tolerant to corruption	6.8	7.2	7.2	7.0
Key stakeholders on the part of contractors (such as contractors, suppliers of goods and services) perceive the district leadership as practising zero tolerance to corruption	6.7	4.8	8.0	6.5
Platforms like the District Integrity Promotion Forums (DIPFs) discuss anti-corruption measures	6.9	3.0	3.6	4.5

Anti-corruption indicators attracted the lowest scores in the assessment, with the exception of the indicator on the investigation of suspected cases of corruption (see Table 8). The local government institutional framework provides an elaborate mechanism for identifying and investigating suspected cases of corruption. The framework provides for internal and external audits, monitoring and supervision by diverse authorities, and for whistle-blowers. The legal framework is well-known in the districts but there is no evidence to suggest its rigorous implementation. For example, issues of non-accountability for funds were raised in internal audits and DPAC reports but this did not arouse any inquest into the possibilities that the funds could have been misappropriated. Secondly, the evidence of poor quality work by contractors does not rule out the possibility of corruption.

The districts, nevertheless, try to create opportunities for citizens to raise accountability concerns. For instance, in Amuria and Napak districts, provision is made in the form of suggestion boxes at the district headquarters in which citizens can anonymously post their complaints or provide information on corruption-related issues. However, awareness of the existence of these anti-corruption mechanisms may be limited to people who regularly access the district headquarters, something which is not common among everyday citizens. There are also challenges regarding the ability of local citizens to write. It is only when they are literate that they can write the information to be put in the suggestion boxes. In this regard, the districts could consider partnering with civil society in the form of CBOs and religious institutions, which can act as interlocutors through which citizens can provide crucial accountability information to local authorities.

DIPFs have been set up in Amuria and Katakwi districts but are non-functional. In Napak district, there is no DIPF. The responsible officials in both Katakwi and Amuria where the DIPFs exist cited financial limitations as the main reason why the forums are not functional. This explanation, however, can be unpersuasive: all district authorities who constitute the DIPFs have their offices close to each other at the district headquarters. Additionally, they can access district meeting rooms at no cost. Therefore, lack of funding is not a persuasive explanation for failing to operationalise the DIPFs.

Anti-corruption was awarded the lowest scores under accountability. The key issues raised include:

- Tolerance of corruption
- Inaction on audits and DPAC recommendations
- Non-functioning of DIPFs

3.2 Service Delivery

Studies have revealed that social services often fail poor people in terms of access, quantity and quality.[11] For local government units to be able to increase access to public services as well as their quality and quantity, they require financial and human resources to manage the delivery processes. Furthermore, as argued in the 2004 World Development Report (WDR), putting poor people at the centre is key to making services work for the poor. The DPRM explored the level of citizen participation in service delivery with a focus on whether citizens are participating in monitoring and sanctioning service providers. The study furthermore assesses the share of service delivery expenditure in comparison with other priorities in the districts. The assessment area also investigates whether the quantity and quality of public services is improving and whether hitherto marginalised groups such as women, the youth and PWDs are gaining increased access to public services.

3.2.1 Resource capacity

Delivery of social services in the education, health, transport, water and other sectors requires substantial financial investments. This assessment area examined the financial resources available to districts for service delivery. It also examined whether the district budgets were based on local priorities. The assessment area furthermore considered the extent to which the districts co-operate with the private sector and civil society actors to mobilise resources for delivering public services.

Table 11: Scores for the indicators under resource capacity

Indicators	Amuria	Katakwi	Napak	District average
The district receives sufficient funds (from) the central government and locally generated revenues to finance service delivery needs	8.9	8.0	8.1	8.3
The district budget takes into account local priorities	9.8	9.6	8.7	9.4
There is functional co-operation (and co-ordination) between the public, private sectors and civil society actors (NGOs) in mobilising resources for service delivery	8.7	9.0	8.5	8.7
The district generates considerable local revenue to finance service delivery	7.4	7.0	7.8	7.4

According to the assessors, the relatively high scores under this assessment area (see Table 9) were based on limited variations between the district approved budgets and actual revenues received. However, the high scores do not mean a healthy financing situation for the delivery of public services in the districts. The low variations in budgets and expenditures result from the fact that the districts tend to budget modestly, given that through the IPFs, they receive prior information about the funds that will be available for a specific financial year. Therefore, the budget framework papers are determined in large part by the IPFs. Thus, despite the high scores, critical sectors such as education, health, works and production remain seriously underfunded.

[11] World Development Report 2004.

The districts lack resources to respond to emerging challenges. During the time of the assessment, for example, agricultural activities had been hit by the invasion of the armyworm, which destroyed crops and presents a serious food security risk. The assessed districts were, during the same period, recovering from famine caused by a prolonged drought. However, the district authorities reported lack of funds to deal with the armyworms and other emergencies. The districts were unable to support farmers with pesticides nor could extension workers be facilitated to reach out to communities to provide information about armyworm control measures.

There are modest efforts to co-operate with civil society actors in resourcing service delivery. However, the districts largely lack a clear mechanism for co-ordination with civil society actors, yet there are several NGOs operating in the areas. UN agencies and international NGOs, however, are an exception to this challenge as these mostly implement their programmes in close co-operation with district authorities. They also provide direct grants in the form of off-budget support targeted to sectors with critical financing gaps. In most cases, however, local NGOs are largely detached from the district administration and do not provide timely updates to district authorities on their programming and financing. The districts lack detailed information about the interventions of local NGOs and how much these NGOs are spending in the districts. According to a senior official in Napak, most NGOs only 'provide work plans and not the budgets' and some NGOs that operate in the district are not known to the local authorities.

Co-operation with the private sector is limited owing to weak rural local economies. The local economies are dominated by subsistence farmers and lack strong businesses that could have the capacity to engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR) as a way of contributing towards service delivery financing. Therefore, co-operating with the private sector to provide funds for service delivery is largely out of reach for the assessed districts.

Local revenues are allocated towards service delivery. However, local revenues are meagre largely because of weak local economies. The assessed districts are predominantly rural with their populations primarily engaged in subsistence rain-fed agriculture. According to national-level analyses, subsistence farmers are not involved in the money economy and, therefore, do not contribute directly towards public revenue. A few activities that fall outside subsistence farming are mostly informal off-farm household enterprises such as urban trade and boda-boda riding, and those involved in these activities are barely taxed.

Kangole Market in Napak is one of the major sources of local revenue to the district. It operates once a fortnight

Public markets are the main sources of local revenue for the districts. Management of the markets is tendered to private contractors based on a concessional agreement with the district administrations. In the assessment year, however, market concessioners in some instances failed to meet their financial obligations, citing a decline in business activity due to the long drought that diminished agricultural output and, by extension, weakened business activities. In Katakwi district, it was reported that a tender holder for a major market wrote to the district indicating that he would be unable to pay the agreed amount owing to reduced revenues from the market.

The capacity of districts to apply the available resources towards local needs is affected by unforeseen demands from the central government. This case particularly relates to pledges by the president. During tours in the districts, the president made certain pledges without necessarily providing financing for the commitments. In turn, the MoFPED demanded that the districts include the presidential pledges in their budgets without providing additional financial allocation. This 'distorts the district planning', remarked a respondent. 'The presidential pledges, although relevant, are not necessarily among the immediate local priorities,' added the respondent. In Katakwi, the district was asked to provide for the purchase of a school bus that had been pledged by the president. In Napak, district structures at Morulinga Hill were taken over by the President's Office and turned into a state lodge. In return, the president pledged to compensate the district with the construction of council chambers. In the end, however, the district was required to fund the council chamber construction from local revenue. Given the limited local revenue at the district, this project has stalled with only a ground slab to show for it.

Financing service delivery presents the number one challenge to districts. It is underlined by

- A limited budget allocation from the central government
- Dismal local revenues
- A weak or non-existent private sector
- Inadequate co-ordination with NGOs
- Evolving challenges: climate variability, pests and diseases

3.2.2 Management capability

As was applied in the assessment for accountability, the DPRM views a district administration as a collection of capabilities to deliver public goods and services. With regard to service delivery, management capability focused on the extent to which the districts can absorb all received revenues for service delivery within the financial year. It also examines the existence of a monitoring, evaluation and learning framework and whether key staff positions for service delivery are substantively filled.

Table 12: Scores for Indicators under Management Capability

Indicators	Amuria	Katakwi	Napak	District average
District is able to spend all revenues (including transfers from the central government and local revenue) on assigned projects within a specified time frame	9.3	8.1	8.2	8.5
District has a clear service delivery monitoring, evaluation and learning framework	8.8	8.9	8.4	8.7
Service delivery (staff positions) in the district are substantively filled	6.0	6.2	8.0	6.7
Data on services delivered by the district is readily available and accessible	9.0	8.6	9.2	8.9
The district clearly co-ordinates and monitors delivery of public goods and services by all providers, be it public, private or civil society	8.4	6.8	7.8	7.7

The districts registered high scores under management capability with the exception of the indicator for having service delivery staff positions substantively filled. The explanations provided by the assessors is that the districts are able to absorb the funds received for service delivery. In some instances, however, delays in receiving disbursements from the centre makes it difficult for districts to spend the funds in time. As a political leader in Napak observed, 'some resources are taken back to the central government when not absorbed, and whatever is taken back is not reflected in the subsequent financial year yet the work for which it was meant to do remains undone.' Public sector procurement is a bureaucratic process that takes a long period of time. This means that once the transfers are late, the districts may be unable to execute projects within the financial year.

All the districts provided a documented monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework. However, M&E suffers weak implementation. The District Planning Units (DPUs) could play a pivotal role in gathering data on service delivery but are largely under-resourced in terms of personnel and funds. As a result, the districts suffer considerable data gaps. Although senior district officials conduct project monitoring visits, their interventions are rather sporadic and did not demonstrate any learning element.

There are gaps in staffing for critical service delivery, including personnel such as teachers and medical workers. The recruitment of staff in the districts is based on a wage ceiling, which is a cap on how much a district can spend on wages for certain categories of staff and, by extension, a limit on how many staff can be recruited. The wage ceiling is set by the central government and can only be revised by the centre, specifically the MoFPED and Ministry of Public Service (MoPS). Key sectors such as education and health remain understaffed. The consequences are high teacher-student ratios and high doctor-patient ratios, to mention but a few.

Gaps in service delivery staffing are also explained by the remote nature of the districts. This, it was explained, makes the districts less attractive to those seeking employment. In Napak district, for example, it was reported that only 261 out of 303 primary school teachers were qualified. The District Education Officer (DEO) had the following to say on the limited interest among teachers in working in Karamoja:

> Some teachers use Karamoja as a stepping stone; they apply for recruitment due to teacher gaps in Karamoja, and when they finish accessing the payroll they ask for a transfer, hence staffing at secondary schools is suffocated. Teacher posting at secondary level is by central government…When we refuse the transfer, they still leave but remain on the payroll and continue getting salary. We are considered as still having them on board yet they already left; so, we would rather let them go.

At the time of the assessment, this makeshift structure was the only restaurant serving all staff and visitors at Napak District Local Government headquarters. The people sitting under the tree are in the dining area. By the time the Assessment Team returned for Validation exercise the Hotel had got burnt, leaving staff with hard options. The absence of social facilities in remote areas tend to make them less attractive to those seeking employment.

In some instances, service delivery staff were reportedly working part-time. For example, it was reported that medical doctors tend to work on selected days yet they are expected to be on duty fulltime. Immediate supervisors at the district believe that the remote districts tend to be less attractive to qualified personnel like doctors. For that matter, they argued, a degree of flexibility is acceptable to retain staff who accept to work in those districts. This, nonetheless, contravenes public service employment regulations.

The districts are in general able to expend funds received for service delivery with the exception of delays in the receipt of transfers from the centre. The key constraints around the management capability include the following:

- Unmet staffing needs due to lack of funds and the remote nature of districts
- Weak implementation of M&E systems
- Absenteeism among staff at service delivery points

3.2.3 Service Orientation

Service orientation addresses the level of prioritisation of service delivery……….other needs at the district. For the DPRM, this is measured first by the percentage of the budget allocated to social services. Service orientation is also examined through investigating whether debates in the district council mostly concern service delivery and whether the needs of special groups, i.e. women, the youth and PWDs, are addressed in service delivery planning and implementation. The assessment area furthermore examines the extent to which public infrastructure has access facilities for PWDs.

Figure 4: Latrine at Napak DLG segregated by gender and one stance adapted to cater for PWDs

Table 13: Scores for Indicators under Service Orientation

Indicators	Amuria	Katakwi	Napak	District average
The largest portion of district expenditure (including local revenue) goes to development expenditure	6.5	5.9	7.1	6.5
Debates in the district council mostly concern service delivery	9.8	9.8	9.1	9.5
Women, youth, PWDs and children are specifically addressed in service delivery programmes and projects	9.7	8.3	8.8	8.9
Supervisory staff such as extension workers, inspectors etc. are facilitated to do their work	7.2	7.5	8.4	7.7
Public infrastructure, e.g. schools, hospitals, roads, courts, water sources, toilets are accessible for PWDs	8.5	8.4	9.2	8.7

The indicators under service orientation received mixed scores, with all districts registering relatively low scores regarding the allocation of financial resources to development expenditure. Budget categories concerned with the delivery of social services, such as the construction of and supplies for schools, roads, hospitals etc. are covered under development expenditure. However, a significant portion of district budgets is consumed by staff salaries, which falls under recurrent expenditures.

Debates within the district councils are mostly concerned with service delivery. Minutes of the district councils show proof that local councillors actively raise service delivery issues from their constituencies. However, supervision of service delivery by political leaders remains weak owing to the limited financing. It was reported that a local councillor at the district receives UGX 250, 000 a month and nothing more. This is expected to cover all their expenses in monitoring service delivery and consulting their constituents.

The districts use a mainstreaming approach to address issues of women, the youth, children and PWDs. Women, the youth and PWD councils are in place and are expected to play a curial role in raising and following up on the issues of special groups. However, these councils have limited financing, which makes it difficult for them to fulfil their mandates.

In terms of development planning, the mainstreaming approach enables the integration of cross-cutting issues such as gender, environment and PWDs. In Napak district, for example, ongoing construction works had evidence of ramps for PWDs. It was further reported that project contractors in sectors such as road construction provide for HIV/AIDS sensitisation. On the whole, existing regulations require contractors to offer casual jobs to members of the local communities to ensure local content in the economic opportunities that come with these projects.

Despite financing limitations, there is a general orientation towards service delivery within the districts. District council debates focus on service delivery. However, although councils for special groups such as women and youth exist, they remain under-facilitated so cannot fulfil their mandates. The mainstreaming approach is, nevertheless, enabling social services to be more responsive to the needs of hitherto marginalised groups.

3.2.4 Quantity and Quality Increase

The assessment area measures whether the quantity and quality of public goods and services available to citizens in the district have improved in comparison to previous years. It also assesses whether the districts are registering better service delivery outcomes and whether traditionally marginalised groups such as women, the youth and PWDs are increasingly accessing public goods and services.

Table 14: Scores for the indicators under quantity and quality increase

Indicators	Amuria	Katakwi	Napak	District average
The quantity of service units (such as schools, hospitals, health services, security, roads etc.) is increasing	8.5	7.3	8.1	7.9
The quality of public goods and services is improving	7.3	7.0	8.3	7.5
Service delivery is generating better outcomes	9.0	8.2	8.1	8.4
Traditionally marginalised groups, particularly women, the youth, children, PWDs are increasingly accessing service delivery	9.2	7.7	8.8	8.5

All districts received relatively good scores regarding increase in the quantity and quality of social services. This is explained by an increase in the number of schools and in health infrastructure as well as ongoing road works. For example, the road connecting Karamoja to Soroti was, at the time of the assessment, being paved for the first time.

A new hospital ward in Napak built to modern standards through off-budget donor support

Children in this grass thatched class room block in Amuria sit the same exams with those of Kampala parents

In broad terms, the quantity of social service infrastructure, such as classroom space and health centres, has relatively increased. However, poor-quality structures still dominate. The increase in the number of facilities also does not match the growth in demand for services, particularly due to population increase. In terms of quality, new public infrastructure shows relative modernity in comparison to that constructed in the past. However, structural integrity remains questionable as some buildings develop cracks relatively shortly after construction compared to buildings from the past. In some places, schools still have grass thatched classrooms as the picture above from Amuria shows.

The assessment teams experienced several public service infrastructures such as schools, hospitals and clinics that were both dilapidated and/or lacked the necessary equipment and personnel. This was attributed to insufficient financing.

Inside the dormitory of a boarding primary school in Napak

Service delivery staff lack the necessary facilitation. Lack of facilitation mostly applies to workers in the agricultural extension services. It also affects inspectors in works, education and health. The budget allocations for inspection remains meagre and this is partly explained by the overall limited resource envelope available to the districts.



Girl children drawing water in Amuria District. Boreholes are a main source of clean water but remain limited in the assessed districts.

Service delivery outcomes remain low in the assessed areas. For example, according to the 2016 Demographic Health Survey (DHS), the Karamoja region (where Napak district is located) presented the highest rate of malaria among children (70.3 per cent).[12] The Teso region (where Amuria and Katakwi districts are located) has the highest levels of teenage pregnancy at 26.2 per cent. The eastern region is reported in the 2016/17 UNHS as the area where poverty levels have increased the most, while Karamoja has the highest poverty rate, at 60.8 per cent, in comparison to the national average of 27 per cent. However, other areas, such as maternal health, have improved, for example more than 98 per cent of pregnant women were reported to be receiving care from skilled health providers.

12 Demographic Health Survey 2016.

The quantity of public services is increasing but not fast enough to match the growth in demand. Furthermore, there are challenges on the outcome side demonstrated, for example, by the dramatic increase in poverty rates. The three assessed districts are remote and are disproportionally affected relative to the rest of the country in terms of access to public services.

3.2.5 Citizen participation

Citizen participation considers the extent to which private individuals can influence decisions and processes in the delivery of public services. This assessment areas examined whether the districts have in place a mechanism for consulting citizens on service delivery and whether citizen perspectives influence decision-making.

Table 15: Scores for Citizen Participation Indicator

Indicators	Amuria	Katakwi	Napak	District average
Consultations with citizens on service delivery take place and influences final decisions on public goods and services delivered by the district	7.6	8.0	8.5	8.0

The districts registered good scores on citizen participation. According to the assessors, there is an inclusive public discourse around the delivery of social services in the districts. The budget conference is the main framework under which citizens are expected to contribute to the service delivery planning process. As earlier discussed, however, the effectiveness of the budget conferences is limited by the fact that decisions on financial allocations are made by the central government and dictated through the IPFs. In essence, the budget conferences are largely information events where duty bearers inform citizens of what is coming up. Participants do not have a real chance to influence decisions around resource allocation. As earlier observed, the districts do not have powers to cause alterations to financial allocations determined in the IPFs. For this matter, citizens' perspectives as generated from participatory processes have limited or no impact on how service delivery is financed.

In some districts, community engagement platforms such as barazas are taking place under the sponsorship of civil society actors. The barazas provide a space for citizens to provide feedback and to interact with local authorities on issues of local governance and development. In Amuria district, the assessment team attended a baraza and experienced the significance of such initiatives on the service delivery discourse. However, the barazas lack a structured mechanism for prudent reflection on the districts' service delivery needs, constraints and opportunities for intervention. The barazas, therefore, tend to produce a wish-list of demands on the part of citizens which may not be realistically met by duty bearers. Furthermore, there is no mechanism for ensuring that the promises that may not be realistically met in view of limited financing are prioritised in the next planning cycle for implementation.

4. Conclusion

This report has presented the assessment of the state of accountability and service delivery through the lens of district leaders in Amuria, Katakwi and Napak districts. The high scores awarded by district stakeholders on the state of accountability and service can be problematic. While on-site evidence and data from independent surveys reveal several limitations, public authorities are relatively positive regarding the state of affairs in their districts. This has implications for how local leaders can be mobilised to improve their way of doing things. Any realistic shift towards change will demand that those responsible for managing service delivery and accountability appreciate the nature and magnitude of the challenges faced.

According to the overall scores obtained, the three districts, which are geographically proximate, are perceived to be in close range regarding the state of accountability and service delivery. Amuria district obtained the highest score of 8.5 under accountability, closely followed by Katakwi at 8.1 and Napak at 8.0. In terms of service delivery, Napak district obtained the highest score of 8.4, followed by Amuria at 8.3 and Katakwi at 7.9. These scores represent a composite ranking which combines the scores awarded by stakeholders from within the district through the self-assessment and those awarded by peers through the inter-district peer review. There are no significant variations between the scores obtained in the self-assessment and those obtained in the peer review (see Figure 5).

Self-Assessment Vs External Peer Review Rating of Accountability by Districts



Self-Assessment Vs External Peer Review Rating of Service Delivery by Districts



Average performance on both accountability and service delivery by district



The findings from the DPRM show that the legal requirements for accountability and service delivery were largely followed in districts. However, local governments on their part only have control over the processes not the inputs of service delivery and accountability. For example, the districts control specific processes, such as the participatory planning processes, including budget conferences, the procurement process and supervision of project implementation. However, critical powers regarding budget allocations are centralised. As a result, the local government officials cannot be said to have real power as envisaged in Uganda's decentralisation policy.

Limited control over financial inputs at the district level occurs mostly for two reasons. First, the local economies in the assessed districts are weak and primarily subsistence. For this reason, the local governments generate dismal revenue. Second, funding from the central government, which makes up to more than 97 per cent of the financial resources available to the districts, has two challenges: (1) it is limited in view of the service delivery challenges faced by districts; and (2) central government grants to districts are mostly conditional grants whereby the funds are pre-allocated by the MoFPED through the IPFs; therefore, the districts do not get to choose the expenditure priorities.

Thus, the prevailing accountability and service delivery systems in the districts challenge the notion of decentralisation. Uganda's decentralisation policy is premised on the goal of transferring decision-making powers to local authorities, who better understand local needs and can be more accountable to citizens. However, with financial allocation powers concentrated at the centre, it remains difficult for local circumstances, local needs and local citizens' aspirations to shape decisions on resource allocation. This implies that well-intentioned processes, such as the harmonised participatory planning processes, may have limited or no impact on the service delivery chain in the districts.

The report has, furthermore, highlighted the fact that the assessed districts, which are relatively remote, have unique challenges that need to be considered in national planning and funding. The first challenge relates to limited local revenue generation, which, as earlier mentioned, is linked to weak local economies. Second, delivering public goods and services can be costlier in scattered rural communities. Third, the districts tend to be generally less attractive to qualified staff who tend to prefer opportunities in more developed areas. These considerations need to be taken into account in planning for the assessed districts and other Ugandan districts in similar or related circumstances. Government response through the Discretionary Development Equalisation Grants (DDEGs) reflects a step in the right direction, but more still needs to be done.

This report has demonstrated that while empowering local councils is a key objective of Uganda's decentralisation policy, the councils remain significantly underfunded. While district councils are expected to be funded entirely from local revenues, there are also restrictions regarding how much can be spent on council expenditures. The 40 per cent limit means that dismal resources are available for council activities. Local council meetings are often rushed to cover long agendas in one day and local councillors receive meagre facilitation and, as such, can hardly fulfil their democratic functions. Opportunities that exist for councillors to participate in monitoring projects under the DDEG budget provisions are not exploited.

The findings from the DPRM exercise, furthermore, indicate that monitoring, evaluation and learning processes in the districts are weak. Although all the assessed districts have in place documented monitoring and evaluation frameworks, the implementation of M&E remains weak, with no clear mechanism of learning from monitoring processes. The DPUs could potentially play a crucial role in providing data about service delivery but are largely underfunded and understaffed. Furthermore, service delivery inspectors and extension workers in the education, health and agricultural sectors have limited budgets to fulfil their mandates. The districts, therefore, can hardly take on the roles of monitoring and ensuring accountability for services delivered by the public sector and those delivered by civil society actors and the private sector.

The report has indicated that citizen participation in the process of service delivery and accountability exists through participation in the budget conferences and community engagement dialogues, namely the barazas. However, the available spaces have considerable limitations. The budget conferences have limited impact on resource allocation, considering that the district financial allocation is confined to the IPFs. For this reason, budget conferences are no more than information events. The barazas, on their part, do not provide a space for structured conversations and deeper reflection on the constraints on service delivery in the districts and the realistic opportunities for eliminating these constraints. Instead the barazas are dominated by citizen complaints and a tendency for leaders to offer general – not specific – promises about improvement. In addition, there is no mechanism for ensuring that commitments made during the barazas are implemented.

Finally, the DPRM establishes that several NGOs are active in the districts. However, besides UN agencies and other international organisations, local civil society actors are not co-ordinating with district authorities. This creates a risk of duplication but also means that the districts cannot ensure quality control regarding the services delivered by NGOs.

5. Recommendations

Based on the findings from the DPRM, the study makes a couple of recommendations to improve accountability and service delivery in local governments. The recommendations presented in this report are targeted towards: a) policy change by the government; b) management practices at national and local government levels; and c) advocacy efforts by CSOs, particularly to ensure that the desired changes can be achieved.

xii. Moving Towards a Real Decentralised System

The concentration of decision-making powers in the hands of the central government challenges the principal policy objective of decentralisation. True decentralisation demands that decisions concerning the delivery of public goods and services and, for that matter, financial allocation lie with local authorities, who understand local circumstances and local community needs better.

In the short to medium term, ensuring that local priorities as defined in the district development plans (DDPs) are upheld as the guiding framework for the allocation of resources to districts can be helpful. In other words, the districts development plans should be developed in a highly participative manner and should then guide the IPFs.

In the long term, however, changing the legal framework to give more resource allocation powers to the local governments will be necessary. Such legal change, nevertheless, must be carefully studied and highly consultative. Organisations such as the Uganda Local Governments Association (ULGA) can play a crucial role in bargaining for necessary law reform with a view to increasing the decision-making powers vested in local government authorities.

xiii. Increasing Funding For Local Governments

The expectation that local governments will deliver public goods and services cannot be met if districts remain underfunded. This study finds limited funding to be the number one challenge affecting local governments. Lack of funds constrains the ability of key accountability organs, such as the district councils, to function, hampers the recruitment of critical staff and greatly limits the overall provision of public services.

It is hereby appreciated that Uganda is broadly constrained by limited financial resources. Nevertheless, it is also observed that while the national budget has been increasing considerably over the years, transfers to local governments have not. The central government, therefore, could demonstrate commitment to decentralisation by starting to increase transfers to local governments that are proportionate to increases in the national budget.

xiv. Recognising and Facilitating Local Councils to Fulfil their Mandates

Local councils play a critical role in soliciting citizens' views and ensuring their inclusion in local government plans and programmes. Furthermore, as the top policy-making organs of the district, the district councils require adequate facilitation to be able to meet regularly as well as to execute their mandate concerning accountability and service delivery. This study establishes that limited funding greatly constrains local councils and local councillors from executing their mandates.

Increasing budget allocations to local councils may increase the cost of public administration in the districts. However, the value of increased political involvement in local programmes is crucial, given that development itself is inherently a political process.

xv. Strengthening Citizen-State Bargaining Power At Local Level

There is need for a more structured engagement between citizens on local development. This framework ought to be underlined by structured bargains between the technocratic society, political society and civil society in the districts, to regularly discuss issues of governance, accountability and service delivery.

Existing platforms such as the barazas provide space for citizens to give feedback on accountability and service delivery. However, the barazas remain sporadic and the pressure associated with the meetings does not allow for realistic conversations about the service delivery and accountability challenges in the districts as well as the opportunities that can be leveraged for improvement.

A structured engagement would a) be regularised, b) address the link between the resources available to the districts and the service delivery challenges faced, c) focus on realistic opportunities for addressing accountability and service delivery gaps, and d) include a monitoring mechanism to ensure that decisions reached in the dialogues are followed through.

The establishment of a structured interaction between civil society, political society and the technocratic society would also provide a platform for future DPRM undertakings as well as a continuous conversation on improving local democracy, accountability and service delivery.

xvi. Consolidation Data Collection For Evidence-Based Planning

Strengthening of data collection and the use of data in local government planning and service delivery is key. Access to data on service delivery remains a major challenge to the districts and was experienced throughout the assessment process. Without data, the districts cannot determine how many people they have to plan for as well as ascertaining the results of their interventions. For this reason, there is need to strengthen the DPUs as these can be crucial engines for forerunning M&E as well as gathering relevant data on service delivery.

xvii. Affirmative Action For Poor Rural Districts

Poor districts require a degree of affirmative action in order to address the geographical inequalities that underline service delivery in Uganda. It has been observed that rural districts generate dismal amounts of local revenue yet they must reach out to citizens whose settlements are scattered amidst poor infrastructure. The unit cost of delivering social services can be high, given the lack of enabling infrastructure such as roads and electricity and scattered settlements, to mention but a few. These realities need to be considered in the allocation of funds to districts. Government programmes such as the Peace Recovery and Development Programme (PRDP) have played a critical role, although several gaps remain. With the introduction of DDEG, an opportunity exists for strengthening the financing of poorly resourced districts.

Second, the 20 per cent cap on the proportion of local revenues that can be spent on council activities does not make much sense to districts where local revenue is meagre. The government needs to consider supplementary financing for district councils in such districts, given that the decentralised system ought to be buttressed by locally elected leaders.

xviii. Operationalising District Integrity Promotion Forums

There is need to operationalise the DIPFs. The DIPFs can play a crucial role in following up on issues of accountability and service delivery. In Amuria and Katakwi districts, the DIPFs have been set up but remain non-functional while in Napak, there is DIPF.

Local authorities need to adopt innovative ways of ensuring that the DIPFs function even when special funding for their activities have not been realised. For example, meetings of the DIPFs may not necessarily require special funding since all member of the forums work near each other at the district headquarters and can use the district meeting rooms at no extra costs.

xix. Co-ordination with civil society

There is evidence of active engagement by civil society actors in public affairs and service delivery in the assessed districts. However, except for international organisations, NGOs are considered to be disconnected from the district leadership.

CBOs can be important interlocutors, gathering information about people's needs and channelling people's aspirations to decision-makers. They can also gather crucial information about accountability and service delivery. Besides the obligation for NGOs to fulfil legal requirements of filing annual work plans, budgets and reports with the district community development offices, NGO co-ordination with local authorities is crucial for synergy. Proper co-ordination will, among others, ensure the following: a) that the district authorities can provide quality control over services delivered by NGOs; b) that NGO advocacy reaches supply-side decision-makers in local governments; c) that the risk of duplication between interventions by the district and those by NGOs is mitigated; and d) that NGOs are held to account.

xx. Strengthening Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting

The value of M&E for effective programme delivery cannot be overestimated. If districts are to learn from their experiences and improve the way of doing things, effective M&E processes will be crucial. The DPRM finds that, although districts have documented M&E plans, these are not systematically implemented and lack an integrated learning mechanism.

The possibility to purse effective M&E is linked with strengthening the capacity of DPUs that are expected to gather data relevant to service delivery planning and evaluation. The DPUs remain among the most understaffed and underfunded units of the districts and yet they are expected to co-ordinate the planning function across all departments.

xxi. Strengthening Staff Supervision Practices

There were considerable concerns that some staff at service delivery units, including health centres and schools, are not working for full hours as per their contracts. Despite suggestions that remote districts may feel the need to be 'soft' so as to attract and retain professional staff, this practice stands to be a perverse incentive to employees. Local authorities need to ensure that civil service employment regulations are respected.

xxii. Emphasising Local Economic Development

The future of a functional decentralisation system in part lies with stimulating local economies. Local economic development was one of the primary goals of Uganda's decentralisation reform. For this reason, investing in key sectors such as agriculture, which dominates economic activity in the rural districts, is key. Programmes such as Operation Wealth Creation (OWC) and the Youth Livelihoods Programme (YLP) are already contributing, particularly by providing agricultural inputs and skills development. However, these programmes are doing too little to link farmers to markets, which could provide a stronger stimulus for agricultural transformation.

There are already efforts to ensure local content in projects such as road construction, where casual jobs are by regulation offered to members of local communities. Nevertheless, an integrated local population skilling approach is necessary to ensure that the local population, especially the youth, can incrementally transition from casual jobs, through acquiring the requisite qualifications, to professional ones.

Figure 5: Napak District Officials pose with Assessment Team after the Draft Report Validation Meeting

Annex 1: Detailed Scores across All the Selected Districts

Assessment Area	Indicator	Amuria			Katakwi			Napak			Cross - District Average		
		Self[1]	DPRM	Comp.	Self	DPRM	Comp.	Self	DPRM	Comp.	Self	DPRM	Comp.
A1.1: Sound budget process	District holds annual budget conferences during which expected revenues and expenditures are discussed with citizens	9.8	9.3	9.6	9.5	9.1	9.3	9.5	9.3	9.4	9.6	9.2	9.4
A1.2: Sound budget process	Different district departments contribute to budgeting processes	1 0	7.8	8.9	9.3	1 0	9.7	9.0	9.3	9.2	9.4	9.0	9.2
A1.3 Sound budget process	The district council considers and approves the budget	1 0	9.1	9.6	8.8	9.6	9.2	9.7	9.6	9.7	9.5	9.4	9.5
A1.4: Sound budget process	Reported expenditures are consistent with the approved budget	9.0	8.5	8.8	8.2	9.2	8.7	7.8	8.5	8.2	8.3	8.7	8.5
A2.1:Comprehensive accountability system	District council members and technical staff are aware of and make reference to laws governing local government accountability	1 0	9.2	9.6	8.8	8.2	8.5	8.8	9.3	9.1	9.2	8.9	9.1
A2.2: Comprehensive accountability system	District procurement and disposal processes are consistent with public sector guidelines	9.5	9.2	9.4	8.3	8.8	8.6	7.5	9.8	8.7	8.4	9.3	8.9

A2.3: Comprehensive accountability system	District has and applies a mechanism that regulates and holds private sector actors to account	9.5	6.2	7.9	7.8	7.3	7.6	7.2	8.7	8.0	8.2	7.4	7.8
A2.4: Comprehensive accountability system	District has a mechanism that regulates and holds civil society actors to account	9.7	8.8	9.3	8.5	7.4	8.0	8.3	8.7	8.5	8.8	8.3	8.6
A2.5: Comprehensive accountability system	Information (including financial information) is readily available and accessible	9.6	8.4	9.0	8.3	8.3	8.3	8.5	7.1	7.8	8.8	7.9	8.4
A3.1: Management capability	All staffing positions relating to financial management are substantively filled	5.4	6.7	6.1	8.8	7.5	8.2	5.9	7.1	6.5	6.7	7.1	6.9
A3.2: Management capability	District has a fully constituted and functional District Public Accounts Committee (DPAC)	1 0	6.7	8.4	8.8	1 0	9.4	6.8	7.0	6.9	8.5	7.9	8.2
A3.4: Management capability	District has a fully constituted and functional District Contracts Committee (DCC)	9.4	8.6	9.0	9.8	9.2	9.5	7.5	9.4	8.5	8.9	9.1	9.0
A3.5 : Management capability	District has a fully constituted and functional District Service Commission (PSC)	9.1	9.2	9.2	9.5	9.2	9.4	9.7	9.8	9.8	9.4	9.4	9.4
A3.6: Management capability	Information from audits and reviews is discussed and acted upon	9.7	8.0	8.9	9.2	9.6	9.4	8.8	7.8	8.3	9.2	8.5	8.9

Assessment Area	Indicator	Amuria			Katakwi			Napak			Cross - District Average		
		Self[1]	DPRM	Comp.	Self	DPRM	Comp.	Self	DPRM	Comp.	Self	DPRM	Comp.
A4.1: Citizen participation	There are channels for receiving and addressing formal and informal feedback from citizens on the actions and inactions of leaders	8.8	8.2	8.5	8.4	8.2	8.3	8.0	7.0	7.5	8.4	7.8	8.1
A4.2: Citizen participation	Citizen feedback is a basis for sanctions where cases of impropriety are concerned	1 0	6.1	8.1	9.0	8.9	9.0	8.3	8.2	8.3	9.1	7.7	8.4
A4.3: Citizen participation	The voices of women, youth, PWDs, and children are solicited and taken into account	1 0	8.9	9.5	9.2	7.8	8.5	9.0	8.1	8.6	9.4	8.3	8.8
A5.1 : Separation of powers	The political and technical arms of the district co-ordinate in a way that none sees the other as interfering in their mandate	8.0	8.2	8.1	7.3	5.9	6.6	8.3	7.0	7.7	7.9	7.0	7.5
A5.2: Separation of powers	Central government representatives (RDCs, DISO, DPC) co-ordinate with local government authorities in a way that none sees the other as interfering in their mandates	9.3	8.2	8.8	7.8	7.2	7.5	7.5	7.7	7.6	8.2	7.7	8.0
A6.1: Anti-corruption	Cases of suspected corruption are expeditiously investigated and acted upon as required by law	8.8	8.7	8.8	9.3	9.3	9.3	9.0	7.7	8.4	9.0	8.6	8.8

A6.1 : Anti-corruption	Key district stakeholders on the leadership side (such as Chairperson, Councillors, Technical Staff, DPC, RDC, State Attorney, etc.) perceive the district leadership as practising zero tolerance to corruption	8.0	7.0	7.5	5.5	6.7	6.1	7.4	7.8	7.6	7.0	7.2	7.1
A6.2: Anti-corruption	Citizens in the district are perceived to be non-tolerant to corruption	8.2	5.3	6.8	7.5	6.8	7.2	6.8	7.5	7.2	7.5	6.5	7.0
A6.3: Anti-corruption	Key stakeholders on the side of contractors (such as contractors, suppliers of goods and services) perceive the district leadership as practising zero tolerance to corruption	7.7	5.7	6.7	3.2	6.3	4.8	8.2	7.8	8.0	6.4	6.6	6.5
A6.4: Anti-corruption	Platforms like the District Integrity Promotion Forums (DIPFs) discuss anti-corruption measures	9.0	4.8	6.9	0.0	6.0	3.0	2.7	4.5	3.6	3.9	5.1	4.5
A6.5: Anti-corruption	Suspected cases of corruption are widely discussed and castigated in the media	7.8	7.7	7.8	9.7	7.5	8.6	7.6	6.0	6.8	8.4	7.1	7.7
B1.1: Resource capacity	The district receives sufficient funds (from) Central Government and locally generated revenues to finance service delivery needs	9.0	8.7	8.9	8.2	7.8	8.0	8.3	7.8	8.1	8.5	8.1	8.3
B1.2: Resource capacity	The district budget takes into account local priorities	9.8	9.8	9.8	9.7	9.5	9.6	8.8	8.5	8.7	9.4	9.3	9.4

Assessment Area	Indicator	Amuria			Katakwi			Napak			Cross - District Average		
		Self[1]	DPRM	Comp.	Self	DPRM	Comp.	Self	DPRM	Comp.	Self	DPRM	Comp.
B1.3: Resource capacity	There is a functional co-operation (and co-ordination) between the public, private sectors and civil society actors (NGOs) in mobilising resources for service delivery	9.8	7.5	8.7	8.7	9.2	9.0	7.9	9.1	8.5	8.8	8.6	8.7
B1.4: Resource capacity	The district generates considerable local revenue to finance service delivery	9.2	5.5	7.4	5.8	8.2	7.0	7.7	7.8	7.8	7.6	7.2	7.4
B2.1: Management capability	District is able to spend all revenues (including transfers from central government and local revenue) on assigned projects in specified time	9.8	8.7	9.3	8.2	8.0	8.1	8.2	8.2	8.2	8.7	8.3	8.5
B2.2: Management capability	District has a clear service delivery monitoring, evaluation and learning framework	8.8	8.8	8.8	9.0	8.7	8.9	9.0	7.8	8.4	8.9	8.4	8.7
B2.3: Management capability	Service delivery (staff positions) in the district are substantively filled	6.5	5.5	6.0	6.2	6.2	6.2	7.7	8.2	8.0	6.8	6.6	6.7
B2.4: Management capability	Data on services delivered by the district is readily available and accessible	9.7	8.3	9.0	8.4	8.8	8.6	9.5	8.8	9.2	9.2	8.6	8.9

B2.5: Management capability	The district clearly co-ordinates and monitors delivery of public goods and services by all providers be it public, private or civil society	9.8	7.0	8.4	5.8	7.8	6.8	8.2	7.3	7.8	7.9	7.4	7.7
B3.1: Service orientation	The largest portion of district expenditure (including local revenue) goes to development expenditure.	6.3	6.7	6.5	6.5	5.3	5.9	8.5	5.7	7.1	7.1	5.9	6.5
B3. : Service orientation	Debates in the district council mostly concern with service delivery	1 0	9.5	9.8	9.8	9.7	9.8	9.8	8.4	9.1	9.9	9.2	9.5
B3.2: Service orientation	Women, youth, PWDs, and children are specifically addressed in service delivery programmes and projects	1 0	9.3	9.7	8.8	7.8	8.3	8.5	9.0	8.8	9.1	8.7	8.9
B3.3: Service orientation	Supervisory staff such as extension workers, inspectors etc. are facilitated to do their work	7.3	7.1	7.2	7.6	7.3	7.5	8.3	8.4	8.4	7.7	7.6	7.7
B3.4: Service orientation	Public infrastructure e.g. schools, hospitals, roads, courts, water sources, toilets, are accessible for PWDs	9.2	7.8	8.5	8.7	8.0	8.4	9.1	9.3	9.2	9.0	8.4	8.7
B4.1: Quantity & quality increase	The quantity of service units (such as schools, hospitals, health services, security, roads etc.) is increasing	9.5	7.5	8.5	7.0	7.5	7.3	8.3	7.8	8.1	8.3	7.6	7.9
B4.2: Quantity & quality increase	The quality of public goods and services is improving	7.7	6.8	7.3	6.5	7.5	7.0	8.3	8.3	8.3	7.5	7.5	7.5

Assessment Area	Indicator	Amuria			Katakwi			Napak			Cross - District Average		
		Self[1]	DPRM	Comp.	Self	DPRM	Comp.	Self	DPRM	Comp.	Self	DPRM	Comp.
B4.3: Quantity & quality increase	Service delivery is generating better outcomes	9.7	8.3	9.0	8.3	8.0	8.2	8.8	7.3	8.1	8.9	7.9	8.4
B4.4: Quantity & quality increase	Traditionally marginalised groups particularly women, youth, children, PWDs are increasingly accessing service delivery	9.1	9.2	9.2	7.6	7.7	7.7	8.8	8.8	8.8	8.5	8.6	8.5
B5.1: Citizen participation	Consultations with citizens on service delivery takes place and influences final decisions on public goods and services delivered by the district	9.1	6.1	7.6	7.6	8.3	8.0	8.8	8.2	8.5	8.5	7.5	8.0
Grand Average Across All 3 Districts		**9.0**	**7.8**	**8.4**	**7.9**	**8.1**	**8.0**	**8.2**	**8.1**	**8.1**	**8.4**	**8.0**	**8.2**

Annex III: DPRM Data Collection Tool.

Follow this link for the tool: www.udn.or.ug

1 Self = Self-Assessment (Assessors from own district); DPRM = (Assessors from other districts); Comp. = Composite (Average Scores for assessment areas in all districts

Annex 2: Composition of the Assessment Team

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